# Shirley---Round 6---vs. CSUF MR

## 1NC

## OFF

### T---1NC

#### The role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### The ‘core’ antitrust laws are Sherman, Clayton, and FTC

Michael A. Rataj 21, PC, Law Degree from the Detroit College of Law, “Consequences for Breaking Antitrust Laws”, 5/12/2021, https://www.michaelrataj.com/blog/2021/05/consequences-for-breaking-antitrust-laws/

The core antitrust laws are…

The three core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act primarily prohibits unreasonable restraint of trade and monopolization. Those who are in violation of the Sherman Act may face hefty fines, up to $100 million, and up to 10 years behind bars.

The FTC Act prohibits unfair practices or acts and unfair approaches to harming competition. Only the FTC can file cases under this act. The Clayton Act is a catch-all that covers every practice not covered by the Sherman and FTC Acts. Then consequences for violations of both of these acts are usually civil in nature.

#### ‘Expanding the scope’ must increase the area covered by antitrust law

Cesar A. Noble 17, Judge on the Connecticut Superior Court, Hartford Judicial District, 777 Residential, LLC v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 2017 Conn. Super. LEXIS 4178, \*4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. August 1, 2017), 8/1/2017, Lexis

The defendant relies upon §7-249 as authority for the supplemental assessment. The statute provides that "[b]enefits to buildings or structures constructed or expanded after the initial assessment may be assessed as if the new or expanded buildings or structures had existed at the time of the initial assessment." The parties dispute whether the conversion of the property constitutes a construction or expansion of buildings or structures granting authority to the defendant to levy a supplemental assessment. The plaintiff argues that because the conversion did not constitute an expansion, that is, an increase in the volume or physical area of a building the defendant had no authority under §7-249 for the supplemental assessment. 5 In the view of the plaintiff it is significant that the conversion did not increase the physical footprint or interior square footage of the property in any way including by a vertical [\*5] enlargement. Absent such an increase, asserts the plaintiff, there can be no construction or expansion of any building or structure. The defendant assert that the construction of the 285 new residential units constitute new structures within the plain meaning of §7-249. The court agrees with the defendant.

[FOOTNOTE]

5 The plaintiff relies upon the definition of the word "expand" found in Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 2002) of "to open up; to increase the extent, number, volume, or scope of."

#### Violation---the affirmative doesn’t defend prohibitions on anticompetitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of its core antitrust laws.

#### The impact is clash---debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics---they allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage, because all the aff has to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world---this crushes clash because all of our prepared negative strategies are based on praxis, and by not defending a clear actor and mechanism we lose 90% of negative ground, and the aff still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible---clash is an intrinsic good and it’s vital to the overall practice of debate. Every debater is here for different reasons, but they trace back to the pedagogical uniqueness of the space. An open topic prevents iteration through shallow debates, unpredictable advocacies, and lack of testing.

### Frame Subtraction---1NC

#### We affirm the 1AC sans its request for the ballot.

#### The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that siphons off political energy and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses.

Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism.

Rhetorical resistance

That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice.

The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups.

The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn.

Resistance criticism

Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63).

Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse).

By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance.

What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered:

(1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice.

(2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center?

(3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative.

(4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized.

The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between

resistance and rhetorical criticism.

Rhetorical criticism

As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism.

The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

### Non-Violence---1NC

#### The aff’s insurgent anti-statist violence shies away from complete adherence to principles of non-violence which escalates anti-black militarization

Domhoff 5, Professor of Sociology at UC Santa Cruz (William, Social Movements and Strategic Nonviolence, www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/change/science\_nonviolence.html)

Despite the effectiveness of strategic nonviolence, complete adherence to it has been abandoned by some of the most visible and influential activists since the mid-1960s. This move toward the inclusion of violent acts in the repertoire of movement tactics began when Black Power advocates became increasingly impatient with the lack of responsiveness to plans for increasing political and economic integration after the Civil Rights Movement achieved its primary goals through the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. They were first deeply disappointed by the failure of the 1964 Democratic National Convention to seat the integrated delegation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. That delegation was rejected, at the insistence of President Lyndon B. Johnson, except for two tokens, in favor of a racist delegation of tradition Southern Democrats who would not even pledge to support the Democratic nominee. It was truly a defining moment, a great divide between egalitarians and liberals within the Democratic Party on how to confront Southern white racists . Militant black activists also watched in despair as the conservative voting bloc continued to limit those kinds of government spending that might give African-Americans a chance to improve their economic position. Moreover, there was foot dragging and outright refusal by trade unions to integrate their apprenticeship programs. This situation suggested that the unionized white working class was not prepared to share good jobs with African-Americans, belying the support for civil rights by many union leaders. Nor was there any sign of a loosening in residential segregation, which meant among other things that African-Americans would not have access to the best public schools. For understandable but lamentable reasons, then, several top leaders in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee gave up on nonviolence and working with whites, creating conflict within the organization with those who wanted to continue as a nonviolent and integrated movement. Soon after, Black Power advocates won out in this argument, turning to inflammatory rhetoric about "taking up the gun" that threatened many whites and validated their worst fears. Black Power advocates then found allies in the North with the creation of the Black Panther Party, a self-identified revolutionary Marxist group, whose goals and armed confrontations with the police led to shoot outs and deaths in several cities. The Black Power stance of the Black Panthers and what remained of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee gave the movement for African-American equality and opportunity a violent and frightening image that alienated most whites. Feeling blocked on all sides, and doubting that whites would become any less prejudiced, many African-American communities exploded on their own, starting in south central Los Angeles in 1965, often in response to policy brutality, and with little or no prompting from Black Power advocates. These upheavals reached a peak in the extensive protests and property destruction in reaction to the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968. Contrary to claims that they were aimless riots, they turned out to be more purposeful and targeted at specific businesses than was originally thought. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that jobs were created in response to these eruptions, and funding for existing government programs targeted at ghetto areas was increased. In the first few years after these long hot summers, it seemed like the uprisings had a pay-off, and therefore made some political sense. However, with the help of hindsight, a bigger fact needs to be faced: the long-term effects of the violence were negative. The outbursts were an understandable reaction to pent-up frustration and anger, and they had specific messages to deliver, but they were nonetheless a political mistake. The fact that they occurred shows the need for any future egalitarian movement to have its principles clear and in place before becoming involved in highly emotional events that are not easily understood or controlled as they unfold. It is not possible to spread the word about why violent disorders are not a good idea while they are happening. A new egalitarian movement would have to explain why they are unproductive well before they are on the horizon, not sit back and let them happen. For example, the gulf between blacks and whites expanded as the disruptions continued over several summers. Suspicion and anger were increased on both sides. Cities like Newark and Detroit still had not recovered from the withdrawal of investment 35 years later. "Law and order" became a code word for the enlargement of a criminal justice system that was used to control black communities. Some white voters in the North expressed their approval of a hard-line government approach by voting against the Democratic candidates for president in 1968 and 1972, helping to destroy the New Deal coalition in the process. Polls are also quite telling on the negative consequences of violence. While American public opinion gradually liberalized from the 1960s to the 1980s on a wide range of issues championed by egalitarian movements, such as women's rights, it went the other way on anything to do with violence and disorder. For example, from 1965 to 1969 there was a 26 percent rise in the percentage of people saying that courts were not harsh enough, bringing the total to 83 percent. Support for the death penalty declined from 73 percent in 1953 to 47 percent in 1965, but then jumped back up to 50 percent in 1966 and to 80 percent by 1980.

#### Evaluate consequences in degrees – political violence strengthens governments and materially devastates quality of life – vote neg to endorse absolute adherence to nonviolence.

**Saba 15**, (PhD in political science from University College Dublin and lectures in international relations in Ramon Llull University. Claudia has over five years’ experience in advocacy work on Palestine. In 2011 she acted as media spokesperson for Irish Ship to Gaza, the Irish segment of the Freedom Flotilla, Palestinian armed resistance: the absent critique, [www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Issue-7-2-Saba.pdf](http://www.interfacejournal.net/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Issue-7-2-Saba.pdf))

The absent critique The critique that one would hope to find among activists is around the **effects** of armed resistance both on Palestinian lives and on the Palestinian cause. The two are not necessarily the same and a positive contribution by armed resistance to the Palestinian cause may work to justify its disastrous results on Palestinian lives. However, I would argue that armed resistance has neither advanced the Palestinian cause nor protected Palestinian lives. On the contrary, it may have **strengthened Israel's hand to crush the Palestinians with impunity**. Ever since Hamas became confined to the Gaza Strip it has pursued the "cause" through inter alia armed means. It made no gains from this in the form of concessions from Israel; it did not liberate an inch of land and it did not reverseIsrael's cruel siege of Gaza. Meanwhile life in Gaza has **severely deteriorated** as a result of repeated military confrontations with Israel. Israel's latest war on Gaza "**eliminated what** was left of **the middle class**" and sent "**almost all of the population into destitution** and dependence on international humanitarian aid" (UNCTAD, 2015: 8). Compounding Israel's policies towards Palestinian infrastructure, environment and natural resources, which had rendered Gaza nearly uninhabitable (United Nations, 2012), the armed resistance has proven **immensely costly** to the Palestinians. As such, one might expect an energetic debate about it among those involved in advocating for Palestinian rights. For example, efforts could be made to amplify the voices of Palestinians opposed to armed resistance. Campaigns could be launched to publicly dissociate from Hamas's and other armed groups' tactics so as to discourage support for their methods. In particular a debate could be extended on the use of nonviolence for the attainment of political goals, as famously put forth by Gene Sharp (1973). Maintaining nonviolent discipline, according to Sharp's theory of "political jiu-jitsu", can bolster the view that Israel's treatment of the Palestinians is deeply unfair and must be countered. When Hamas launches rockets at Israel it **diminishes perceptions** of the conflict as lopsided; indeed the rockets may give the false impression that Palestinians can defend themselves. Yes, of course Israel would find ways to undermine an exclusively nonviolent resistance strategy -- oppressive regimes often do. Here advancements in nonviolent theory such as the "backfire" method whereby activists anticipate the oppressor's response to nonviolent mobilzation and **take action to make it backfire** could be discussed.by activists (Martin, 2015). And although usual acts of nonviolent resistance such as demonstrations, boycotts and sit-ins would not work in Gaza since it is deprived of direct contact with Israel and the world, alternative acts of protest and civil disobedience could be explored and made possible by collaboration with activists on the outside through the use of information technologies and other means. Moreover, debates with regard to activists' vision for the cause must interrogate the role of armed resistance. Many activists have proposed a vision of a single state in Israel/Palestine in which all would enjoy equal social and political rights while at the same time ensuring just redress for injustices incurred (Abunimah et al, 2007). Although many SMOs engaged in the movement do not officially take a position on the one/two-state debate, campaigners have increasingly argued that the two-state solution is no longer attainable given the number of Israeli settlements in Palestinian areas. In this context, conferences advocating for one democratic state have become more common (Farsakh, 2011)1. Debates in this area remain at the theoretical level and have not defined the means of reaching the one state goal. The continuation of armed confrontation between Israel and Palestinian groups is likely detrimental to the prospects of a single democratic state. However this, to my knowledge, has not been addressed. On the contrary, there is confusing discourse around campaigns such as BDS that seems to leave the door open to armed resistance. For example, in an assessment of BDS in the Palestinian publication Al Majdal, one author warned of the "dogma" of nonviolence that could come to plague BDS and asserted that "violent and nonviolent tactics have always co-existed as forms of resistance and they are likely to do so in the future" (Sultany, 2013: 15-16). Nonviolent discourse among Palestine activists, according to Sultany, "has become more fashionable today since it resonates with Western perspectives" (Sultany, 2013: 15). This sort of talk **needs to be challenged** by a healthy and rigorous debate on the real merits of committing to unarmed methods. I provide further examples of Arab commentators who criticize nonviolence in a later section. For now, suffice it to say that **evading criticism** of armed resistance has become the norm among many people active in the movement, as I demonstrate in the next section.

### Neoliberalism---1NC

#### The 1AC’s refusal of political mobilization targeting the state and civil society locks in neoliberal capitalism and catastrophic climate change---the foremost task of the political left should be development of strategies to retake state power to break down capital

Christian Parenti 15, professor in the Global Liberal Studies Program at New York University; interviewed by Vincent Emanuele, writer, activist and radio journalist, 5/17/15, “Climate Change, Militarism, Neoliberalism and the State,” <http://www.cc-ds.org/2015/05/climate-change-militarism-neoliberalism-and-the-state/>

You mention mutual aid and how it was overhyped by the left in the aftermath of Katrina. I’m thinking of the same thing in the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy. You’ve been critical of the left in the US for not approaching and using the state apparatus when dealing with climate change and other ecological issues. Can you talk about your critique of the US left and why you think the state can, and should, be used in a positive manner?

Just to be clear, I think it is absolutely heroic and noble what activists have done. My critique is not of peoples’ actions, or of people; it’s of a lack of sophistication, and I hold myself partly accountable, as part of the US left, for our deficiencies. With Hurricane Sandy, the Occupy folks did some amazing stuff. Yet, at a certain level, their actions became charity. People were talking about how many meals they distributed. That’s charity. That is, in many ways, a neoliberal solution. That’s exactly what the capitalist system in the US would like: US citizens not demanding their government redistribute wealth from the 1% to the 99%. The capitalists love to see people turn to each other for money and aid. Unwittingly, that’s what the anarcho-liberal left fell into.

This is partly due a very American style of anti-state rhetoric that transcends left and right. The state is not just prisons or the military. It’s also Head Start, quality public education, the library, clean water, the EPA, the City University of New York system – a superb, affordable set of schools that turns out top-notch, working-class students with the lowest debt burdens in the country.

There’s a reason the right is attacking these institutions. Why does the right hate the EPA and public education? Because they don’t want to pay to educate the working class, and they don’t want the working class educated. They don’t want to pay to clean up industry, and that’s what the EPA forces them to do. When the left embraces anarcho-liberal notions of self-help and fantasies of being outside of both government and the market, it cuts itself off from important democratic resources. The state should be seen as an arena of class struggle.

When the left turns its back on the social democratic features of government, stops making demands of the state, and fails to reshape government by using the government for progressive ends, it risks playing into the hands of the right. The central message of the American right is that government is bad and must be limited. This message is used to justify austerity. However, in most cases, neoliberal austerity does not actually involve a reduction of government. Typically, restructuring in the name of austerity is really just a transformation of government, not a reduction of it.

Over the last 35 years, the state has been profoundly transformed, but it has not been reduced. The size of the government in the economy has not gone down. The state has become less redistributive, more punitive. Instead of a robust program of government-subsidized and public housing, we have the prison system. Instead of well-funded public hospitals, we have profiteering private hospitals funded by enormous amounts of public money. Instead of large numbers of well-paid public workers, we have large budgets for private firms that now subcontract tasks formerly conducted by the government.

We need to defend the progressive work of government, which, for me, means immediately defending public education. To be clear, I do not mean merely vote or ask nicely, I mean movements should attack government and government officials, target them with protests, make their lives impossible until they comply. This was done very well with the FCC. And my hat goes off to the activists who saved the internet for us. The left should be thinking about the ways in which it can leverage government.

The utility of government was very apparent in Vermont during the aftermath of Hurricane Irene. The rains from that storm destroyed or damaged over a hundred bridges, many miles of road and rail, and swept away houses. Thirteen towns were totally stranded. There was a lot of incredible mutual aid; people just started clearing debris and helping each other out. But within all this, town government was a crucial connective tissue.

Due to the tradition of New England town meeting, people are quite involved with their local government. Anarchists should love town meetings. It is no coincidence that Murray Bookchin spent much of his life in Vermont. Town meetings are a form of participatory budgeting without the lefty rigmarole.

More importantly, the state government managed to get a huge amount of support from the federal government. The state in turn pushed this down to the town level. Without that federal aid, Vermont would still be in ruins. Vermont is not a big enough political entity to shake down General Electric, a huge employer in Vermont. The Vermont government can’t pressure GE to pay for the rebuilding of local infrastructure, but the federal government can.

Vermont would still be a disaster if it didn’t get a transfer of funds and materials from the federal government. Similarly in New York City, the public sector does not get enough praise for the many things it did well after super storm Sandy. Huge parts of the subway system were flooded, yet it was all up and running within the month.

As an aside, one of the dirty little secrets about the Vermont economy is that it’s heavily tied-up with the military industrial complex. People think Vermont is all about farming and boutique food processing. Vermont has a pretty diverse economy, but agriculture plays a much smaller role than you might think, about 2 percent of employment. Meanwhile, the state’s industrial sector, along with the government, is one of the top employers, at about 13 percent of all employment. Most of this work is in what’s called precision manufacturing, making stuff like: high performance nozzles, switches, calibrators, and stuff like the lenses used in satellites, or handcrafting the blades that go in GE jet engines. But I digress … As we enter the crisis of climate change, it’s important to be aware of the actually existing legal and institutional mechanisms with which we can contain and control capital.

I often joke with my anarchist and libertarian friends and ask if their mutual-aid collectives can run Chicago’s sanitation system or operate satellites. Of course, on one level, I’m joking, but on another level, I’m being quite serious. I don’t think activists on the left properly understand the complexity of modern society. A simple example would be how much sewage is produced in a single day in a country with 330 million people. How do people expect to manage these day-to-day issues? In your opinion, is there a lack of sophistication on the left in terms of what, exactly, the state does and how it functions in our day-to-day lives?

It’s sobering to reflect on just how complex the physical systems of modern society are. And though it is very unpopular to say among most American activists, it is important to think about the hierarchies and bureaucracies that are necessarily part of technologically complex systems.

A friend of mine is a water engineer in Detroit, and he was talking to me about exactly what you’re mentioning. The sewer system in Detroit is mind-bogglingly enormous and also very dilapidated and very expensive. To not have infrastructure publicly maintained, even though the capitalist class might not admit this, would ultimately undermine capital accumulation.

You asked if there is a lack of sophistication. Look, I’m trying to make helpful criticisms to my comrades on the left, particularly to activists who work so hard and valiantly. I’ve criticized divestment as a strategy, yet I support it. I criticized the false claims that divesting fossil fuels stocks would hurt fossil fuel companies. The fossil fuel divestment movement started out making that claim. To its credit, the movement has stopped making such claims. Now, they say that it will remove the industries "social license," which is a problematic concept that comes from the odious world of "corporate social responsibility." However, now, students are becoming politicized, and that’s always great news.

For several years, some of us have been trying to get climate activists, the climate left, to take the EPA and the Clean Air Act seriously. The EPA has the power to actually de-carbonize the economy. The divestment logic is: Schools will divest, then fossil fuel companies will be held in greater contempt than they are now? Honestly, they’re already hated by everybody. That does what? That creates the political pressure to stop polluting? We already have those regulations: the Clean Air Act. There was a Supreme Court Case, Massachusetts v. EPA, that was ruled on in 2007. It said the EPA must regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Lots of professional activists in the climate movement, at least up until very recently, have been totally unaware of this.

Consequently, they are not making demands of the EPA. They are not making demands of their various local, state and federal environmental agencies. These entities should be enforcing the laws. They have the power. It’s not because the people in the climate movement are bad people or unintelligent. They’re dedicated and extremely smart. It’s because there’s an anti-state ethos within the environmental movement and a romanticization of the local.

On a side note, I don’t think all of this stuff about local economies is helpful. Sometimes I think this sort of thinking doesn’t recognize how the global political economy works. The comrades at Jacobin magazine have called this anarcho-liberalism. I think that is a great way to describe the dominant ideology of US left, which is both anarchist and liberal in its sensibilities. This ideology is fundamentally about ignoring government, and instead, being obsessed with scale, size, and, by extension, authenticity. Big things are bad. Small things are good. Planning is bad. Spontaneity is good. It is as insidious as it is ridiculous. But it is the dominant worldview among the US left.

Do you really think that this is the best way to approach the industry, through mobilizing state resources?

Look, the fossil fuel industry is the most powerful force the world has ever seen. Be honest, what institution could possibly stand up to them? The state. That doesn’t mean it will. Right now, government is captured by these corporate entities. But, it has, at least in theory, an obligation to the people. And it also has the laws that we need to wipe out the fossil fuel industrial complex. This sounds fantastical and nuts, but I don’t think it is. I’ve been harping on this in articles and a little bit at the end of Tropic of Chaos. According to the Center for Biological Diversity, Nixon-era laws can be used to sue developers, polluters, etc. You might not be able to stop them, but you can slow them down. The Clean Air Act basically says that if science can show that smoke-stack pollution is harmful to human health, it has to be regulated.

If there was a movement really pushing the government, and making the argument that the only safe level of CO2 emissions is essentially zero … We have the laws in place. We have the enabling legislation to shut down the fossil fuel industry. We should use the government to levy astronomical fines on the fossil fuel companies for pollution. And we should impose them at such a level that it would undermine their ability to remain competitive and profitable.

Part Two:

Vincent Emanuele: Much of the green washing, or capitalism’s attempt to brand itself as green, focuses on localism and anti-government, market-driven programs. Do you think this phobia of the state among the US left is a result of previous failed political experiments? How much of this ideology is imposed from outside forces?

Christian Parenti: Some state phobia comes from the American political mythology of rugged individualism; some comes from the fundamentally Southern, Jeffersonian tradition of states’ rights. Fear of the federal government by Southern elites goes back to the founding of the country. The Hamiltonian versus Jeffersonian positions on government are fundamental to understanding American politics. I wrote about this for Jacobin magazine in a piece called "Reading Hamilton from the Left."

Lurking just beneath the surface of states’ rights is, of course, plantation rights. Those plantations, places like Monticello, were America’s equivalent of feudal manors where, in a de facto sense, economic, legal and military power were all bound up together and located in the private household of the planter. Those Virginian planters were the original localistas.

Nor did that project end with the fall of slavery, or the end of de jure segregation in the 1960s. Southern elites didn’t want Yankees telling them what to do; how to treat their slaves, how to organize their towns, how to run their elections, how to treat the environment – none of that! The South is a resource colony and its regional elites, some of them now running multinational corporations and holding important posts in the US government, believe they have a right to do what they wish with the people and landscape. Historically, that’s a large part of what localism and local democracy meant in the South. It meant that White local elites were "free" – free to push Black people around, free to feed racist fantasies to the White working class. They didn’t want interference from the outside. So, some of that anti-statist ideology comes from that plantation tradition.

Another part of it comes from the real failures and crimes of state socialism, though state socialism also had, and in Cuba still has, many successes. The social welfare record of what we used to call "actually existing socialism" was pretty impressive. But there were also the problems of repression, surveillance and bureaucratization, which were partly the result of capitalist encirclement, partly the result of the ideological hubris rooted in ideological overconfidence in the allegedly scientific power of Marxism, partly the result of simple corruption among socialism’s political class. These real problems were central themes in the Cold War West’s educational and ideological apparatus of (generally right-wing) messaging from the press and the political class. In this discourse, communism was the state, while freedom was the private sector. Thus, the United States and freedom became embodied in popular notions of the private sector and individualism.

Of course, the great, unmentioned contradiction in this self-fantasy is the fact that American capitalism has always been heavily, heavily dependent on the state. Modern society, despite its fantasies about itself, is intensely cooperative and collective. Look at how complex its physical systems are; that cannot be achieved without massive levels of coordination and collective cooperation, much of it provided by the rules and regulations of government. The knee-jerk anti-statism, what the folks at Jacobin call "anarcho-liberalism," is also rooted in experience. The less social power you have, the more the state is experienced as an invasive, demeaning, oppressive and potentially, very violent bureaucracy. Neoliberalism would not have gotten this far if there wasn’t an element of truth to this critique of its bureaucracy and regulation. It has also used ideas that have old cultural tractions, like freedom.

Such are the contradictions of the modern democratic state in capitalist society. Government is rational, supportive, humane, [and offers] redistribution in the form of Social Security, high-quality public schools, environmental regulation, the Voting Rights Act and other federal civil rights laws that have helped break hegemonic power of local and regional bigots. But government is also militarized policing, the bloated prison system, spying on a vast scale; it is child protective services taking children from loving mothers on the basis of bureaucratic traps, corrupt corporate welfare at every level from town government to federal military contracting. The racist, sexist, plutocratic and techno-bureaucratic features of the state create fertile ground for people to turn their backs on the whole idea of government.

What has been the impact of the right’s ability to effectively propagandize the White working class in the US?

Rightist intellectuals, academics, journalists, media tycoons, university presidents and loudmouth politicians work diligently to capture and form the raw experience of everyday oppression into an ideological common sense. To be clear, I use that term in the Gramscian sense, in which common sense refers to ruling class ideology that is so hegemonic as to be absorbed and naturalized by the people. The constant libertarian assault on the radio, in newspapers, on the television, this drumbeat of anti-government discourse is an old story – but still very important for understanding the anarcho-liberal sensibility. Just tune in to AM radio late on a weekday evening and listen to the anti-government vitriol. It’s sort of wild.

Someone could do an interesting study, Ph.D., in unpacking the cultural history of all this. It is tempting to speculate that deindustrialization, having disempowered and made anxious many huge sections of the working class, opens the way for fantasies of empowerment. The anti-statist, rugged individualist common sense is also always simultaneously a fantasy of empowerment. White men are particularly vulnerable to these fantasies. The classic guy who calls into the batshit crazy, late night, right-wing talk radio show is a middle-aged White man. Listen closely to the rage and you hear fantasies of independence. In this rhetoric, guns and gun rights become an obviously phallic symbol of individual empowerment, agency, self worth, responsibility etc.

But most importantly, we have to think about how all of this anti-state ideology is being stirred up with investments from elites. The neoliberal project is to transform the state through anti-statist rhetoric and narratives. They sell the idea that people need to be liberated from the state. But then push policies that imprison people while liberating and pampering capital. It is hard for the left to see itself in this sketch – the angry, beaten-down, middle-aged White guy calling in from his basement or garage. But I think these much-documented corporate efforts to build neoliberal consent permeate the entire culture and infect us all, if even just a little bit.

This is the intellectually toxic environment in which young activists are approaching the question of the climate emergency. Young activists should be approaching the climate crisis the way the left approached the economic crisis during the Great Depression. We need to drastically restructure the state. We need it mobilized and able to transform the economy. The New Deal was imperfect, of course. It left domestic workers and farm workers out of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It was inherently racist. It dammed rivers and was environmentally destructive. However, the New Deal was radical in its general empowerment of labor; its distributional outcomes were progressive and it achieved a modernizing transformation of American capitalism. Not to overstate the case, but the New Deal could be a reference point for thinking about the beginning of a green transformation that seeks to euthanize the fossil fuel industry. We have to precipitously reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build a new power sector. That much is very clear.

However, let me be clear: Shutting down the fossil fuel industry – mitigating the climate crisis – is not a solution for the environmental crisis. Climate change is only one part of the multifaceted environmental crisis. Shutting down the fossil fuel industry would not automatically end overfishing, deforestation, soil erosion, habitat loss, toxification of the environment etc. But carbon mitigation is the most immediately pressing issue we face. The science is very clear on this. Climate change is the portion of the overall crisis that must be solved immediately so as to buy time to deal with all the other aspects of the crisis. Because I take the political implications of climate science very seriously, I am something of a carbon fundamentalist.

#### The alternative is a politics of organizing around the common experience of life shaped by political economy. This starting point creates a mode of solidarity that doesn’t just add categories and stirs but creates an inclusive class identity via struggle that transforms participants.

Leo Panitch 18, York University Canada Research Chair in Comparative Political Economy, From the Streets to the State: Changing The World By Taking Power, pg 26-28

What accounts for the impasse of the left by the late twentieth century? Over the last four decades one of the central tropes of intellectual discourse, epitomized by the popularity of Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, criticizes the strategic mistake of excessively emphasizing class identity and consciousness. Even Geoff Eley’s (2002) monumental historical study, quoted above, which demonstrates how effective socialist labor movements were as advocates for democratic reform, also stresses “the insufficiencies of socialist advocacy,” not least pertaining to gender and race, in terms of “all the ways socialism’s dominance of the Left marginalized issues not easily assimilable to the class-political precepts so fundamental to the socialist vision” (10). Yet the left’s current conundrum in the face of the new right also brings to light the insufficiencies of the politics of identity, which has not only filled the void of class politics in recent decades but has often played a significant role in shunting class aside. Adolph Reed Jr. (1999) has perhaps most powerfully made the case for “a politics focused on bringing people together” around the common experience of everyday life shaped and constrained by political economy—for example, finding, keeping or advancing in a job with a living wage, keeping or attaining access to decent healthcare, securing decent, affordable housing. . . . Such concerns and the objective of collectively crafting a vehicle to address them is a politics that proceeds from what we have in common. . . . To the extent that differences are real and meaningful, the best way to negotiate them is from a foundation of shared purpose and practical solidarity based on a pragmatic understanding of the old principle that an injury to one is an injury to all. This is not simply a politics that attempts to build on a base in the working class; it is a politics that in the process can fashion a broadly inclusive class identity. (xxvii–xxviii) The failure to absorb this strategic insight, which might entail severe costs even for liberal democracy, is becoming ever clearer amidst the reactionary electoral appeal of a new right to working class voters. Nevertheless, this chapter shall argue that it also has much to do with the longstanding problems with the practice of democracy inside the institutions of the labor movement and the political parties with which they were intertwined. It has become far too commonplace to address these problems by criticizing the “ontological” mistake of those theorists who advance a class-oriented politics. This is a kind of idealism which attributes far too much historical impact to theoretical texts. It avoids serious inquiry into what determined the actual historical practices of working class parties and unions as democratic institutions. It thereby fails to uncover what really accounts for their limited contribution to the development of workers’ democratic capacities so as to carry the struggle for democracy beyond the electoral arena to the workplace, to the corporations and banks that dominate the economy, and perhaps most important to the democratization of the institutions of the state.

## Case

### Top Level---1NC

#### Debate is not “critical to the ecology of the state”---this is a claim without a warrant AND debate, via iterative engagement, is a site that uniquely allows for breaking down traditional views of institutional engagement and creates subjects that constantly question the entities around them, including the state.

#### Anarchist geographies terminate in political futility. Recognition by and transformation of state power is the only productive path to emancipation.

Natasha King 16, Taught at the University of Nottingham and Caseworker with the British Refugee Council, No Borders: The Politics of Immigration Control and Resistance, p. 39-42

But to what extent are these experiments in autonomy ever entirely autonomous? In response to Richard Day’s book on the newest social movements, Richard Thompson argues that it’s unrealistic to talk about creating wholly autonomous social structures because ‘[t]he second they’re consequential is the second they’ll be noticed [by the state]. At that point, it becomes impossible to break the cycle of antagonism by will alone. They will come after us’ (Thompson n.d., emphasis added). In other words, experiments in autonomy are rarely (if ever) entirely free from a relation to the state, or from state antagonism, and we are rarely able to ignore that antagonism. We may antagonize the state, but we are forced also to respond to the state, as a form of self-defence. This has happened time and time again, from the steady illegalization of squatting in Europe, and the tightening of laws around private property, to the infiltration by the CIA of the Black Panther movement, to the struggle between the Zapatistas and the Mexican state. We see this in the struggle for the freedom of movement when, continuing with the examples above, the EU employs Frontex special missions on the Turkish/Greek borders, or when the living spaces of people without papers are raided or destroyed. Whether people have been forced to, or they have seen it as the best strategy, the history of struggles for liberation has been one that included demands on the state. Often this has taken the form of engagement in a politics of rights and/or recognition. From the movement of the Sans Papiers in France, to ‘a Day without Migrants’ in the USA; from campaigns that fight against the detention and deportation of people without papers, to struggles against police violence, resistance through forms of visible collective action have been central to struggles against the border. In most cases such struggles have made demands on the state, particularly through seeking recognition as a group, and through making claims to rights. But to what extent are demands for rights and/or recognition part of a no borders politics? Demands for rights and recognition have played a big part in the struggle for the freedom of movement. Yet there has been a long history of criticism over the politics of citizenship. Rights claims, for example, have been seen as essentially reinforcing the role of the state as the benefactor and grantor of rights, and reinforcing the notion that rights represent entitlements applicable to those who fit certain descriptions of being a human (cf. Arendt 1973 [1951]; Barbagallo and Beuret 2008; Bojadžijev and Karakayali 2010; Elam 1994). From this perspective, demands for rights and representation amount to disputes over the allocation of equality and therefore can only ever achieve a redistribution of that equality, rather than undermining the idea that equality is somehow qualified in the first place. As Imogen Tyler says, ‘[c]itizenship is a famously exclusionary concept, and its exclusionary force is there by design. The exclusions of citizenship are immanent to its logic, and not at all accidental. Citizenship is meant to produce successful and unsuccessful subjects. Citizenship, in other words, is “designed to fail”’ (Tyler, quoted in Nyers 2015: 31). Similar variations of this critique have appeared in the autonomy of migration debate. Representation can also be thought of as a bordering technology that seeks to pacify and discipline expressions of autonomy (or attempts at escape) (Papadopoulos et al. 2008). In other words, the politics of citizenship is problematic because it only ever brings people into the state. ‘Of course migrants become stronger when they become visible by obtaining rights, but the demands of migrants and the dynamics of migration cannot be exhausted in the quest for visibility and rights’ (ibid.: 219). I have a lot of sympathy with these arguments, and because of them am extremely suspicious of a politics of citizenship. But when it comes to actual practices of struggle against the border, a resolute stand against such strategies seems naïve, and insulting to those who have taken part. Migrant-led struggles have often been claims for rights, and ultimately I don’t want to dismiss such practices because they are philosophically problematic. In fact, sometimes to appeal to rights or recognition is the only available strategy in situations of extreme vulnerability, where people’s options are highly limited. Recognizing that we are in relations of power right now means also recognizing that our situation is imperfect and that we have to struggle in our (imperfect) reality. Youssef, a long-time activist for the freedom of movement in Greece, himself of North African descent, talked about the need for pragmatism in tactics; that sometimes we must engage with the state in order to bring about greater freedoms now. ‘Today, in Creta, in Chania, they will catch five people. How can I take them from the jail? I have something in the police station, OK. I have to talk with them today. OK? But tomorrow I can fuck him. He’s not my friend. He’s not my comrade. OK. We are talking today. Tomorrow we are fucking’ (interview, Youssef). His statement reflects how many practices that refuse the border often come out of necessity. In other words they’re rarely part of some intentional or ‘noble’ act to become a rights-bearer, say, and more often pragmatic decisions based on the need to alleviate immediate situations of oppression. A no borders politics seeks to go beyond claims to representation and rights that ultimately stand to reinforce the state. But claims to representation and rights can sometimes do this too. Building on Foucault’s idea that power can be both positive and empowering or negative and dominating, Biddy Martin and Chandra Mohanty suggest that fighting oppression involves seeing power in a way that refuses totalizing visions of it and can therefore account for the possibility of resistance, as in creating something new, within existing power relations (Martin and Mohanty 2003: 104). Suggesting that representation only ever brings people into power therefore means rejecting a vast range of moments when the oppressed have voiced their refusal to be reduced to non-beings outside of politics (Sharma 2009: 475). In other words, resistance is not only or always a reaction to the constraining effects of dominating power, but can also express power as something positive and liberating. From the Black Panthers to the Sans Papiers, demands for representation, when carried out by minority groups for themselves, can challenge the role of dominant power over that group and create new, emancipated subjectivities (Goldberg 1996; Malik 1996). Depending on who it is that acts, then, in some cases demands for recognition/rights can be a radical and transformative political act (Nyers 2015. See also Butler and Spivak 2007; Isin 2008; Nyers and Rygiel 2012). As Nandita Sharma suggests, in response to Papadopoulos et al.’s book Escape Routes, we must recognise that making life and fashioning our subjectivities are intimately intertwined and making ‘new social bodies’ … is not the same as bringing people back into power through identity politics (or identity policing). It is important to recognise that there are significant qualitative differences between subjectivities. There are those that Papadopoulos et al. rightly discuss as bringing us directly back into power – and which account for most of the subjectivities that people hold today (‘race’, ‘nation’, ‘heterosexual’, ‘homosexual’, ‘native’ and so on) – but there are also those that are born of practices of escape. (Sharma 2009: 473, emphasis in original)

#### Opaque, immanent insurrection poses only fleeting and ineffective challenges, degrades into right-wing reactionary politics, and trades-off with organized praxis that’s more effective in responding to state violence

Dr. Marla Zubel 13, Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities, Now Professor of English at Western Kentucky University, BA in Literature and Sociology from the University of California, Santa Cruz, “The Utopian Catastrophism of Insurrectionary Politics”, The New Everyday – A Media Commons Project, 2-21, <http://mediacommons.org/tne/pieces/utopian-catastrophism-insurrectionary-politics#sdfootnote2sym> [TCI = The Coming Insurrection]

Following Lukács, it is possible to see how TCI may provide a compelling, if not graphic, description of the state of the world and yet fall short in its strategic response – offering only the arbitrary demand of insurrection which confronts history as something alien and thus beyond saving. Lukács rightly identifies the counter-revolutionary logic of such a position, which reproduces “the inhumanity of class society on a metaphysical and religious plane” (190). The ‘revolutionary’ utopianism of such views,” he claims, “cannot break out of the inner limits set to this undialectical ‘humanism'” (191).

From nihilism to utopianism to “undialectical humanism,” accusing the theoretical framework of TCI of reactionary tendencies in terms of its arrested dialectics is perhaps overly uncharitable. The recent popular uprisings in the Arab World, Europe and now the United States may offer compelling examples of insurrectionary politics in action. The Invisible Committee's efforts to make comprehensible these insurrections and the forces they fight against is both politically necessary and intellectually admirable. The ability of these insurrectionary events to break from and reset the social and economic conditions of our world is still to be determined, but certainly these moments of rupture – the negating rage of the insurrectionary event as “propaganda by deed” – may yet hold the potential to coalesce into large-scale revolution. In that regard the political manifesto-as-field-guide that is TCI may prove timely and useful.

But, if texts like TCI, masquerading as a break from the dead-end of anti-globalization utopianism, discourage thinking through the contradictions of the present, a present which necessarily by virtue of these contradictions offers, or at least motions towards, a way out, it provides little by way of a revolutionary strategy. More significantly perhaps, its political ambiguities may actually encourage it to drift into more reactionary, right-wing political territory, as we have seen lately with the rise of the anti-statist Tea Party movement in the U.S, and the right-wing libertarian threat to blow the Occupy impulse off course. Furthermore, TCI's anti-organizing attitude of invisibility risks digging its own grave in the form of the “commune,” which can do no more than attack and retreat before finally being quietly dealt with by the violence of the state. Invisibility might not be a strength after all.

The way out of the impasse of the present moment is not through the dark corridors of insurrectionary nihilist-utopianism. While there is much to admire in TCI's attempt at a thorough diagnosis of the contemporary state of civilization, its failure to work through the contradictions of the present and thus to articulate a truly revolutionary praxis of not only negation but also dialectically mediated transformation, ultimately leaves it impotent to overcome the very crisis it aims to attack. Despite TCI's insistence to the contrary, the only solution to the crisis will have to be a social one.

#### Undoing squo power relations requires analyzing and attacking power structures through agonistic struggle---normative appeals alone are ineffective.

Naomi **Zack 17**. Professor of philosophy at the University of Oregon. 02/2017. “Ideal, Nonideal, and Empirical Theories of Social Justice: The Need for Applicative Justice in Addressing Injustice.” The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, Oxford University Press.

Ideals of justice may do little toward the correction of injustice in real life. The influence of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has led some philosophers of race to focus on “nonideal theory” as a way to bring conditions in unjust societies closer to conditions of justice described by ideal theory. However, a more direct approach to injustice may be needed to address unfair public policy and existing conditions for minorities in racist societies. Applicative justice describes the applications of principles of justice that are now “good enough” for whites to nonwhites (based on prior comparisons of how whites and nonwhites are treated). Social information just dribbles in, bit by bit, and we simply get used to it. A single story about a person really hits home at once, but the grinding injustices of daily life are endured. It is easy to ignore them and we do. Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (Shklar 1990, 110) IDEAL theory about justice extends from Plato’s Republic to John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, including many careers devoted to analyses and criticism about such texts in political philosophy. Rawls offers a picture of the basic institutional structures of a just society, on the premise that in order to correct injustice, we must first know what justice is. According to Rawls, while “partial compliance theory” studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice, full compliance theory, or ideal theory, studies the institutional principles of justice in a stable society where citizens obey the law. Rawls began A Theory of Justice with the claim: “The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems” (Rawls 1971, 8). Rawls’s ideal theory is too abstract to correct injustice or provide justice for victims of injustice in reality, because it is based on a thought experiment and the assumption of a “well-ordered” society in which there already is compliance with law (Zack 2016, 1–64). What people care about in reality concerning justice is not what ideal justice is or would be, but how immediate injustice can be corrected. Injustice is always specific in concrete events that are recognizable as certain types, for example, theft, murder, or police racial profiling. Injustice can be corrected by punishing those responsible for it in specific cases and instituting social changes that prevent or reduce future occurrences of the same type. Rawlsian nonideal theories of justice, constructed for societies where people do not comply with just laws, rely on ideal theory as a standard for just institutional structures. The main question driving nonideal theory is how to construct a model or picture of justice that will result in the future correction or avoidance of present injustices. John Simmons quotes John Rawls from Law of Peoples, on this matter. Nonideal theory asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or worked toward, usually in gradual steps. It looks for courses of action that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective [LOP p. 89]. (Simmons 2010, 7) However, injured or indignant parties may not care about the long-term goal of justice that could lead to balance or compensation for their situations. Not only are what P. F. Strawson (1962) called “reactive attitudes,” such as moral indignation, blame, and a desire for deserved punishment, strong in their focus on injustice, but the best theory of justice in the world does not tell us what to do about the injustices we are faced with in the here and now, especially “the more pressing problems” of race-related injustices. Such questions cannot be answered with reference to ideal theory or some application of ideal or nonideal theory to their concrete situations, because the a priori nature of both of these does not provide a fit with specific contingencies—ideal and nonideal theories do not generate practical bridge principles. As theories, they posit ideal entities, but without the apparatus of scientific theories which provides connections to observable entities or events. (Moulines 1985). The correction of injustice or injustice theory requires a philosophical foundation for itself. Models of justice have often been naïvely utopian throughout the history of philosophy, because they are based on an assumption of automatic total compliance, as though the right words or pictures by themselves have the power to transform reality, or as though agreement with those right words or pictures will automatically result in action that will automatically make the world instantiate those words or pictures. When they are not fantastically and ineffectively utopian in this way, such models have been used to justify the already-existing dominance of some groups over others. (A prime example is John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, written decades before 1688 Glorious Revolution, to express the interests of the new rising class of landed gentry, which were eventually fulfilled by a Protestant king on the throne and a strong representative parliament after that revolution [Laslett 1988].) Models of justice have legitimately served to inspire law in modern societies with government constitutions and national and local law. But, sometimes, as in US founding documents, although universal and absolute justice is proclaimed, subsequent events make it clear that this language was intended to legitimize just treatment for members of selected groups only, that is, white male property owners, at first. As a result of just law and its selective application, over time, there comes to be justice for an expanding group, but still not everyone in society. However, what is written, together with descriptions of real justice for some, can be a powerful lever for obtaining justice for at least some of the excluded. To understand how that works, it is necessary to develop an approach to justice that begins with injustice, in real situations where there is already some degree of justice in a larger whole. The extension of existing practices of justice to members of new groups is applicative justice, a concept with substantial historical and intellectual precedent, although not by that name. In what follows, more will be said about the idea of applicative justice and then its history will be considered. Voting rights and housing rights are examples of candidates for applicative justice in our time. Finally, content in the form of narrative may be motivational for social change. The Idea of Applicative Justice Applicative justice is an approach to justice with the goal of making the unjust treatment of some comparable to those who already receive just treatment. Applicative justice takes a comparative approach, for example, comparing how young black males are treated by police officers in contemporary US society, to how young white males are treated (Jones 2013; Zack 2013, 2015). Applicative justice rests on a pragmatic approach to social ills, which includes the premise, based on Arthur Bentley’s 1908 insights in The Process of Government, that government is much more than the apparatus of state and written laws and court decisions. Government is an extended, dynamic process, an ongoing contention among interest groups in society. This full-bodied, empirical and pragmatic view of government process entails, for example, that we consider as parts of the same political mix/phenomenon/raw material all of the foregoing: the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 1960s Civil Rights Legislation, doctrines of probable cause, the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans, racial profiling, and police homicide with impunity. Thus, Rawls’s insistence that “the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests” (Rawls 1971, 4), should be understood as “the rights secured by justice should not be subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests.” In reality, “the rights secured by justice” are constantly subject to political bargaining and the living calculus of social interests. One consequence of this empirical perspective is that moral outrage, critiques of white supremacy, or analyses of white privilege, along with other forms of blame, cannot be assumed to have the power to change anything, by themselves. By contrast, changing relationships between police officers and their local communities, or changing the rules of engagement when police stop or attempt to stop suspects, might on this view have some causal power (Ayres and Markovits 2014). It is important to realize that such changes in practice would not be specific applications of a theory of justice, but ways of changing social reality into a different political mix. However, a better theory of justice, even a more racially egalitarian one and even a theory of applicative justice that was widely accepted, would still be no more than a change in what Bentley calls “political content.” Any theory of justice or any set of just laws is compatible with widespread racially unequal and unjust practice. And the converse also holds. Unjust laws or laws with gaps for unjust practice are compatible with just practice. Thus, applicative justice is pragmatic in taking the whole political mix/ phenomenon/raw material as its subject for a specific injustice. Unlike ideal or nonideal justice theory, the applicative justice approach brooks little faith that reality can be changed by a special conceptual space or mode of critical moral discourse that is undertaken apart from reality. Reality cannot be changed by normative pronouncements, by or on behalf of the oppressed, but only by shifts in existing interests of groups of real people. To base hopes for change on normative content alone may ~~paralyze~~ [eliminate] the means for taking action that could result in change, because such content proceeds as though matters of justice were only matters of argument. Those who have opposed social racial justice have understood this well enough, because instead of mainly arguing against new just law over the twentieth century, they have taken action to block progress. Race and Justice Consideration of race and injustice together, within political philosophy, focuses on the need for specific groups to not be treated unjustly. For a group to be treated justly, a large number of its members need to be treated justly. But for a group to be treated unjustly, it is sufficient if a smaller number or lower proportion than required to meet the standard of just treatment be treated unjustly. One reason for this asymmetry is that just treatment is easily normalized within communities, whereas unjust treatment of only a few is disruptive and considered abnormal among other members of the group to which victims belong (although not necessarily by members of groups who are generally treated justly). The unjust treatment of a small number ripples from their friends and relations to other members of the same group, who realize that they are subject to similar unjust treatment from their membership in that group alone. More broadly, if the group treated justly and the group treated unjustly belong to the same larger collective, such as whites and blacks in the United States, then the unjust treatment of even a very small number of that total collective of residents or citizens should be disruptive to the whole collective, given promulgated principles of “justice for all.” But that does not always happen, at least not in ways that result in real change. Apathy and self-absorption of those not treated unjustly is part of the reason, although another significant part is that the group treated justly already knows that the national collective rhetoric of justice is intended to apply primarily to them. It is that kind of disparate treatment, which does not disrupt everyone, even though it should, which calls for a theory of applicative justice, on the abstract level where people call for justice. But applicative justice is not only an abstract theory. Applicative justice requires comparisons of group treatment. If minorities are treated unjustly, a description of that injustice does not require an ideal or nonideal theory or model of justice, but simply a comparison with how the majority is treated. (The term “minorities” refers to those disadvantaged or oppressed, because sometimes minorities are greater in number than “majorities,” e.g., blacks under apartheid in South Africa, American slaves in some Southern states, or black Americans in some twenty-first-century cities.) The principles and mechanics of justice that work well enough for most white Americans need to be applied to nonwhite Americans. For rhetorical purposes, it might be evocative to talk about black lives or black rights, but strictly speaking the subject is a racial framework that is color-blind in an important part of law—constitutional amendments and federal legislation—but not in reality. This gap between written law and social reality can be viewed as hypocrisy, racial bias, or white supremacy, only if one assumes that written law is an accurate description of, or blueprint for, social reality. But a perspective that takes in the whole process of government reveals that the gap and what is permissible within it, are parts of the same whole process. The contrast between blueprints and maps is important to consider. Political philosophers often proceed as though their writings about justice are blueprints, when they should instead begin by constructing maps. Present politics or a political party in power may present obstacles and challenges to applicative justice in any specific case. Those who aim for applicative justice must struggle against such obstacles and challenges, as well as the ignorance, prejudice, and ill will of large parts of voting publics under democratic government, and in addition, media misrepresentations, business interests in a status quo, and lack of understanding of oppression by those who are treated unjustly. For example, the injustice in the disproportionately large number of African Americans in the US criminal justice system has been supported by law-and-order politics, the War on Drugs, belief in racial gender myths (e.g., the larger-than-life black rapist), explicit racism, media sensationalism of crime committed by black men, profits made by for-profit prison corporations, and embrace of self-destructive subcultures by some black men who become incarcerated. At the same time, as an efficient cause or precipitating factor, ongoing racial profiling by police helps feed the system with new suspects, about 90 percent of whom plead guilty in preference to the risks and costs of a trial (Kerby 2013; Rakoff et al. 2014). Intergenerational poverty, unemployment, and undereducation contain people within this system, and the high rates of nonwhites in the prison population are used as official justification for racial profiling (Zack 2015, chap 2). Thus, the complexity of causes and background factors associated with the disproportionate number of African American male prison inmates can be understood through a number of approaches. The normative approach of applicative justice would be to address those causes or factors, distinctly and individually, through specific changes in concrete practice, as well as changes in law, as relevant.

### Queer Pragmatism---1NC

#### Pragmatic consequentialism is prerequisite to queer flourishing---the framework their evidence assumes is a paranoid reading that interrupts queer becoming.

Adam **Greteman 18**. Department of Art Education, School of the Art Institute of Chicago. “On Reading Practices: Where Pragmatism and Queer Meet,” Sexualities and Genders in Education pp 37-65, Springer.

I want to attend to the reading practices that inform my own work here to be transparent to my readers, but also provide lessons on the different ways in which “theory” informs reading as a practice. I first came to think about reading practices through pragmatism—not queer theory. For some this might seem rather unqueer. There has been little written looking at the ways in which pragmatism and queer theory could be productive together, although I’ve tried (Greteman & Wojcikiewicz, 2014). Nor have pragmatists in general taken up a queer project, despite pragmatism being a little queer. That’s neither here nor there. What is of interest to me in this chapter are reading practices. As Cleo Cherryholmes (1999) illustrated, reading is more than meets the eye. Pragmatism itself is, as well, more than meets the eye. Pragmatism presents a particular form of reading that attends to action. I dwell on pragmatism here to reveal my own pragmatic leanings. I like pragmatism. I also tend to read things I like as I sense, as argued elsewhere, there are pedagogies and politics tied to liking (Greteman & Burke, 2017). Cherryholmes (1999) began Reading Pragmatism, noting that the reason to engage pragmatism was “that pragmatism looks to the consequences that we endlessly bump up against” (p. 3). And we bump up against consequences all day, every day. Those consequences are the results of things we—ourselves and others—have done as well as things far outside of our control. “Pragmatists conceptualize the world where we, all of us,” Cherryholmes argued, “are constantly thrown forward as the present approaches but never quite reaches the future” (p. 3). It is, in his estimation, “a discourse that attempts to bridge where we are with where we might end up” (p. 3). A key word, of course, being “might,” as pragmatism cannot predict what will come, but attends to contemplating conceivably what might come. We don’t know what will come, but we suspect we will come in some way to a future. Pragmatism is less a theory. Instead, it is a way of doing things in the world attending to the conceivable consequences of our actions. Queers come in the world, and in coming they encounter consequences, and not just theoretically. I sense pragmatism’s attention to consequences is important decades into the existence of various queer theories that have offered readings of various types of objects—films, performances, novels, policies, experiences, and more. Those readings—once scandalous in the academy—have now become part of the academy. They have in infiltrating the institutions they once critiqued or parodied or subverted become practices that can inform work that more, now than ever, has the backing of the institution . And, with such institutionalization we can more, now than ever, contemplate the conceivable consequences of queer theory and its attendant practices. We might now be able to think about if and how queer theories have had and could continue to have consequences for the worlds we inhabit—through discourse, material practices, and more. What are the conceivable consequences of various types of queer readings? What do such readings do for readers as those readers encounter the daily work of living? This is a question I will hopefully provide responses to throughout the remainder of this book as I contemplate how queer theory—as I have read and encountered it—has allowed me to contemplate queer thriving. Reading is—this might seem obvious—contingent and contextual. It is informed by our time, objects we have encountered, relationships we have had, and much more. Our readings are not, nor can they be, ahistorical. They will become dated, outdated even, becoming instead signs of a time gone by. Such times gone by might be read—in the present—as a sign of progress. See, things have gotten better as texts written years ago show things were pretty shitty. However, such times might also be read nostalgically as a time one wished one had lived in. “Wow, the 1970s sound fabulous! What happened to us?” I will, I suspect fall into reading things as signs of progress and nostalgically. I hope you’ll forgive me, but I think progress and nostalgia can serve us in various ways. Theoretical traditions serve us in various ways as well. Different theoretical traditions have offered different ways of reading texts . Cherryholmes (1999) illustrated this by providing readings that take an “authoritative” perspective or are informed by deconstruction, new historicism, and, of course pragmatism. This move was pedagogical, providing readers with a strategy to distinguish between related, but different, reading practices. Reading practices, Cherryholmes illustrated, have different consequences for how a text impacts readers and beyond. In addition, his readings illustrated distinctions between particular critical traditions (under the banner of poststructuralism and postmodernism) and pragmatism . Cherryholmes argued: Poststructural and postmodern investigations tend to be investigatory, interpretive, critical, and analytic. They are not forward-looking. They are oriented to commentary and criticism instead of consequences and action. Poststructuralism and its postmodern relatives do not have a project that looks to action, nor do they seek one. (p. 4) “Pragmatism,” as an alternative, “looks to results” (p. 4) but not just any results. The products of pragmatic readings “are never finished. They are interpreted, reinterpreted, and criticized indefinitely” (p. 4). Continuing, Cherryholmes wrote, “as a result, [pragmatic readings] are continually open to new experiences and problems and opportunities. Pragmatist productions deconstruct, they do indeed. And their deconstruction invites, indeed requires, revision and replacement” (p. 4). Pragmatism and its readings embrace the interpretive, analytic, critical options provided by poststructuralism. They are, I think, more alike than they are different. However, pragmatism moves beyond poststructuralism and postmodernism to contemplate action, to roll with the punches in order to make decisions about how to do things in the world. I have, I sense, quoted rather liberally from Cherryholmes above so let me provide my reading. Poststructural and postmodern theories—in which queer theory would be included—do interesting and important work. They deconstruct, interpret, provoke with their readings. They play with words and read against the grain. The work they do is critical since they seek, in part, to expose injustices. Additionally, their work is interpretive, as they do not propose Truth, but offer truths. They are also primarily backward looking. They look back at texts to expose or reveal in those texts their limitations or how the text deconstructs, or how texts illustrate the formation of things. What such ways of readings fail to do (and every reading does some things well and other things less well) is to look forward to the consequences of what they are doing. Deconstructionists or new historicists have not immediately been interested or concerned with contemplating the possible consequences of their readings, although I suspect they are not unconcerned with consequences; being “critical” would imply a certain interest in consequences. Pragmatism on the other hand is forward looking. It attends to the conceivable consequences of its readings. Reading—with a pragmatic bent—is an exercise in reading into the conceivable future that could be the result of actions. It gathers together, assembles, conceivable consequences of doing this, that, or another thing in the world. And this requires interpretive and imaginative thinking. This generally seems rather wishy-washy. How do we determine conceivable consequences? What types of results are we looking for? And what limits help us “conceive” the conceivable? And how do we make choices about what results and consequences we want to help bring to fruition? These are, as Cherryholmes illustrated, important questions to ask and questions that are answered carefully. We seek results that are fulfilling, we decide inclusively, we expose our ideas to multiple interpretations and criticism so as to deal with the ever-changing realities we encounter. We do, in a sense, the work we often are already doing living in the world, except we do so attentively. Such answers are, to be clear, not “idealistic,” rather: At the beginning and end of the day pragmatists are realists because they value what happens. They are interested in results, in consequences. They understand that pragmatist experiments are social constructions. These constructions come from experience and ideas and knowledge and power. Proposed material/ideal and realistic/idealistic distinctions deconstruct because the material conditions in which we find ourselves contribute to and shape what we can conceptualize and enact. Pragmatists try to bring about beautiful results in the midst of power and oppression and ignorance . (Cherryholmes, 1999, p. 5) Pragmatism accepts the contingent realities that we face in our everyday lives where we have to make choices. And those choices are informed and limited in all kinds of ways. We cannot base our decisions on some foundation or truth. Pragmatism is “anti-foundational” since such foundations and “Truth” are already conditioned and constructed. Rather, pragmatism makes its decisions attending to consequences that are satisfying and fulfilling within the complex milieu where we come to understand those very concepts themselves. It exists in the present, is informed by the past, with an eye toward a beautiful future. Reparative Readings Pragmatism—in looking forward —attends to contemplating pleasure and beauty as desired consequences of our actions. Pragmatism is, I suggest, an approach committed to bringing into existence positive affects and actions. This is something decidedly different from most critical traditions. Most critical traditions, as Eve Sedgwick (2004) aptly argued, embrace a hermeneutics of suspicion and this embrace, by the start of the twenty-first century, had become a problem. Sedgwick was concerned that there was a wide spread habit within critical work to engage a hermeneutics of suspicion. And while such hermeneutics—what she calls “paranoid” reading—is an important reading practice, there is a side effect when such reading practices become habitual. Critical theorists—variously situated in queer, feminist, race-conscious, and related theories—for Sedgwick , “may have made it less rather than more possible to unpack the local, contingent relations between any given piece of knowledge and its narrative/epistemological entailments for the seeker, knower, or teller” (p. 124). Paranoid reading, while excellent at exposing things may, in becoming a “mandatory injunction rather than a possibility among other possibilities,” limit encountering, intervening, and creating other possibilities. Or put differently, if we are mandated to do particular types of readings to be considered critical, we become limited in the work that we can do. We find ourselves always looking over our shoulder, paranoid about what enemies are chasing us without looking ahead to things that could trip us up (a paranoid option) or provide us support against our enemies. Reading practices, I hope you see, are never neutral, but always bring with them assumptions and viewpoints about what counts and what does not count. Reading practices inform what we look at, how we look, and where we look. They inform why we look at all. Reading practices frame the world before us and, just as a “frame” does, it sets us up to see (or be seen) in particular ways. Frames—like our reading practices—limn the scene for better and for worse. There are always frames, one task is to begin to see different frames and what they do for the objects they capture within the borders and what they, then, by definition, exclude. Sedgwick illustrated that queer reading practices, by and large, took up a paranoid position, which made sense. Within the history of sexuality, she argued, there was a clear relationship between homosexuality and paranoia. Homosexuality, as theorized by Freud, was connected to paranoia and anti-homophobic inquiries in a similar vein took up the paranoid position, in an attempt to expose the violence of, for instance, heteronormativity (Warner, 1991) or homonormativity (Duggan, 2002) or homonationalism (Puar, 2007). The paranoid position was critical to resistance as it assisted in recognizing and exposing the enemies to queer lives and practices not only at the interpersonal level, but at the cultural, institutional, and disciplinary levels.1 However, as Sedgwick aptly noted, “just because you have enemies doesn’t mean you have to be paranoid” (p. 127). “Indeed,” Sedgwick continued, “for someone to have an unmystified view of systemic oppression does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train of epistemological or narrative consequences” (p. 127). Recognizing the realities of oppressions—in their diversity—does not require that one engage in a particular type of critical project. In fact, limiting oneself to a particular type of project would eliminate the possibility of surprise. Instead, it would leave readers over time with the sense that they are being beat over the head with a bat of the same information. “There’s oppression. Do you see the oppression? Do you see the oppression? It is there, there is the oppression. Do you see it?” This type of exposure is, as Sedgwick noted, a central tenet of paranoid reading practices. However, as she noted “[paranoid strategies] represent a way, among other ways, of seeking, finding, and organizing knowledge” (p. 130). And to be clear, there are important things that paranoid strategies do. Pointing out and exposing oppression is important. However, there are also important things that such strategies fail to adequately address; this being a lesson the tunnel of oppression I addressed in the preface taught me early on. The tunnel of oppression was rooted in exposing, but the moment it sought to promote, to assemble objects that did different work, its work became contested. As an alternative to paranoid reading, but not as a replacement, Sedgwick developed what she called reparative reading, arguing that “to read from a reparative position is to surrender the knowing, anxious paranoid determination that no horror, however apparently unthinkable, shall ever come to the reader as new” (p. 146). To read from a reparative position is to allow for the possibility of surprise and leave open space that things could be different. This is “because the reader has room to realize that the future may be different from the present” (p. 146). Additionally, she continued, “it is also possible for her to entertain such profoundly relieving, ethically critical possibilities as that the past, in turn, could have happened differently from the way it actually did” (p. 146). Reparative reading practices—embracing the contingent and positive—similarly to pragmatism, are concerned with how things could be different. There is with Sedgwick’s reparative readings, like Cherryholmes’s pragmatism, an opening for work looking forward done under the banner of queer theory. Queers do not have to maintain and be determined by their historical connection to paranoid positions, but can invent additional ways of positioning themselves in and against the world. Such a move makes sense as it recognizes the changing realities and needs of queers.

### AT: Guerilla Tactics---1NC

#### No chance any guerilla tactics succeed---the NSA cracks down.

Fredrik deBoer 16, Limited-Term Lecturer, Introductory Composition at Purdue Program, 3/15/16, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will actually work to secure a better world?

In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” The problem, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially never break on the side of armed opposition against the state. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information, before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence. Look, the world has changed. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the numbing agents of capitalist luxuries and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. This just isn’t 1950s Cuba, guys. It’s just not. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States to zero, and so much the worse for us. This isn’t fatalism. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is little alternative to organization, to changing minds through committed political action and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and partisan politics. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are dedicated and committed to organizing, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will move it further to the left still. You got any better suggestions? Listen, commie nerds. My people. I love you guys. I really do. And I want to build a better world. Not incrementally, either, but with the kind of sweeping and transformative change that is required to fix a world of such deep injustice. But seriously: none of us are ever going to take to the barricades. And it’s a good thing, too, because we’d probably find a way to shoot in the wrong direction. I can’t dribble a basketball without falling down. American socialism is largely made up of bookish dreamers. I love those people but they’re not for fighting. And even if you have a particular talent for combat, you’re looking at fighting the combined forces of Google, Goldman Sachs, and the defense industry. Violence is hard. Soldiering is hard. In an era of the NSA and military robots, it’s really, really hard. “Should we condone revolutionary violence?” is dorm room, pass-the-bong conversation fodder, of precisely the moral and intellectual weight of “should we torture a guy if we know there’s a bomb and we know he knows where it is and we know we can stop it if we do?” It’s built on absurd hypotheticals, propped up by the power of anxious machismo, and undertaken to no practical political end. It’s understandable. I get it, I really do. But it’s got nothing to do with us. The only way forward is the grubby, unsexy work of building coalitions and asking people to climb on board.

#### The state is internally fragmented, not a monolith---they overdetermine its essence, crushing resistance

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The Problem With the “Deep State”

The deep state concept is harmful in two key ways.

First, invoking the deep state implies a misleading view of the state as a monolithic, unitary actor. While the deep state is usually said to be a network of individuals and agencies, it is assumed that these component parts are held together by a common will or mission (in this case, something like defending the “national interest” against Trumpism). This leads to a reification of the state as an autonomous and internally coherent force.

Yet modern capitalist states are more fragmented than they appear. First, they are composed of class fractions and coalitions that have frequently clashing interests and are motivated by short-term considerations. Often, these internal differences arise from the pressure exerted by various economic interests (such as the competition between the financial, manufacturing, and small business sectors).

In addition, these class forces are intersected by other factors, including the different social bases of support behind the major political parties (including voter cleavages based on urban versus rural interests, racial and gender attitudes, and “populist” appeal), the mass media’s role in shaping certain ideological narratives, and competing visions of foreign policy and geopolitical strategy.

As the Greek sociologist Nicos Poulantzas wrote in State, Power, Socialism, we need to “discard once and for all the view of the State as a completely united mechanism, founded on a homogeneous and hierarchical distribution of the centers of power moving from top to bottom of a uniform ladder or pyramid.”

The state is better understood as a temporary and historically contingent crystallization of social forces, a formation whose institutions are as liable to come into conflict with each other in times of political duress as they are to align seamlessly in times of stability.

It is not at all clear, then, that the leaks are a power play by a unified deep state. The rivalry within the White House between the Bannon and Priebus camps, and Trump’s intent to govern by executive order (with little consultation from Congress, the Justice Department, or the federal agencies responsible for implementing these orders) have disturbed the normal functioning of the bureaucracy. As state personnel develop ways of coping with the unpredictable and ad hoc nature of this administration, the dissent within their ranks is a sign of the uncertainty that they have been thrown into since the election, rather than a well-coordinated, conspiratorial effort.

Second, to talk of the deep state is to suggest that political power is sealed off from broader social struggles.

The state–civil society binary is one of the fundamental bases of liberal political theory. But this distinction is largely a byproduct of the way that political power has represented itself, rather than a social fact.

Where the state ends and civil society begins has always been permeable and contested — in other words, subject to politics and political struggle. The state is not an entity standing over and above society, but instead one premised upon the social forces that bring it into being.

Loose talk of the “deep state” misses this crucial point, advancing instead a facile vision of institutionalized power that constitutes its own foundation, and is therefore opaque, mysterious, and beyond the reach of citizens.

The State and the Struggle

Rejecting the deep state framework is not an academic exercise. The way we think about the state shapes how we, as democratic agents, conceive of and relate to organized political power. It affects how we organize and participate in the growing movement against the Trump administration and the GOP’s agenda.

Treating the state as a nebulous substratum of bureaucratic networks and institutions — ones that really call the shots behind visible electoral politics — overlooks its potential as a terrain for political struggle. To again quote Poulantzas, “the State is not a monolithic bloc but a strategic field.” Through concerted struggles inside and outside of political institutions, the opposition can displace and alter the state’s internal dynamics. They can attack the hegemonic coalition (currently headed by Trump) at the core.

What would this look in practice? What would it entail for the movement against Trumpism to analyze, leverage, and exploit for its own ends the various coalitions, fractions, and hegemonic blocs within the state that are now publicly clashing?

First, it would mean embracing the plurality of political resistance, from legislative pressure to marches and public demonstrations, economic boycotts, and civil disobedience. Since the election we have seen a new politicization of civil society, and the proliferation of local initiatives seeking to stem the new administration’s onslaught. Among these are the rapid growth of the Democratic Socialists of America, and the movements for sanctuary cities and campuses. These struggles in civil society always reverberate within the state, turning the latter into a contested ground where these new movements can push back, both directly within and outside of state institutions, against the Trump agenda.

Second, it would mean deepening the existing ties between the various popular struggles fighting Trump and the GOP, including the movements for women’s and reproductive rights, immigrant rights, workers’ rights, and environmental justice. In the short term, cultivating a broad coalition around overlapping interests (and seeking to fragment the support behind the Trump coalition, where possible) could encourage a further de-legitimization of the Trump administration’s far-right agenda, and thereby spur more refusals and defections from within the ranks of the civil service. Eventually, this movement building would go a long way in creating a positive common agenda for an already-revitalizing ;eft.

In sum, it would mean challenging the state’s ability to establish the new normal envisioned in Trump’s campaign agenda, and to inject popular struggles into the heart of the ruling coalition, which cannot act without the ongoing support of both major parties and the bureaucracy.

But for any of this to happen, we first have to abandon the idea of a coherent, unitary deep state that is dictating politics behind the scenes. Relying on an illusory deep state to save us indulges in a fantasy at a time when we can ill afford to do so.

## 1NR

### Capitalism K---1NR

#### The fundamental question of this debate is the mechanism by which the aff builds power---all political actions are defined by their relationships to contingent material networks of state resources and political relations, which can be reallocated by the combination of action both within and against the state---but that requires explicit material strategies at the outset, rather than horizontalism

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A shortcoming of the theorists considered in Chap. 5 is the insufficient attention paid to the state; this reflects, to a degree, the rejection of the (communist) party. With the party spurned, attention moved primarily to social movements, as the state was no longer viewed as the principal avenue through which to pursue change. The shortcomings of contemporary activism highlight the need to restore consideration of the state as a conceptual variable. As argued in Chap. 4 , the state has continued to be a major actor in the neoliberal era (despite the reigning doxa). Poulantzas (see also 1978 , pp. 22–24; ibid, p. 17) held that the state is always involved in the constitution and reproduction of the relations of production which, under capitalism, are necessarily exploitative. To understand the capitalist state involves appreciating the conflict of interests present within capitalist relations of production and, by extension, how class struggle is present within these power relations (ibid. p. 25). Social struggle between classes is a “game of provisional compromise” played on an unstable field (ibid, 141)—policies always reflect the outcome of strategic compromises (Levine 2002 , p. 176). Struggle occurs between capital and the masses, and also within capital itself (Poulantzas 1980 , p. 143). The capitalist state needs to represent the long-term interests of the whole of the bourgeoisie, but does so under the hegemony of one of its factions (ibid, p. 307). The State organises and reproduces class hegemony by establishing a veritable field of compromises between the dominant and dominated classes; quite frequently, this will even involve the imposition of certain short-term material sacrifi ces on the dominant classes, in order that their long-term domination may be reproduced. … It should never be forgotten that a whole series of economic measures, particularly concerning the expanded reproduction of labour-power, were imposed on the State by the struggle of the dominated classes . (ibid, p. 184, emphasis in original) Th e state is able to secure the long-run hegemony of the capitalist class by granting certain material demands to the popular masses. Th ese may, at the time, be quite radical in their import, such as the provision of universal healthcare or education—but with a change to the relations of force in favour of the bourgeoisie, such demands can be covertly stripped of their radical content (ibid. p. 185). An example is the privatisation of public assets in recent years (as argued in Chap. 4 ). The granting of material demands to the public is increasingly taking place through the private sector, reflecting the decline of popular demands aimed at the state following the defeat of organised labour. The means of aligning factions of the working class with bourgeois projects has (as explored in Chap. 4 ) involved tying them into financial markets through their pension funds and access to easy credit. The bailout of financial markets by the state (a move overwhelmingly in the interests of the capitalist class) could, consequently, be justified to sections of the working class on the basis that it protected their assets. The play of compromise, of give and take, which takes place under the auspices of the state means “the precise configuration of the ensemble of state apparatuses … depends not only on the internal relation of force in the power bloc but also on the role they fulfil in respect to the dominated classes” (Poulantzas 2008 , p. 311)—a position signalling Poulantzas’ debt to Gramsci ( 1971 , p. 182), who had argued that the interests of the … dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria … between the interests of the fundamental group and those of subordinate groups—equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point. The state, then, needs to be seen as a relation of forces—it is the material condensation of the struggle that takes place among classes (Poulantzas 1980 , pp. 128–29). No one class ever has complete control of all state institutions (Bratsis 2002 , p. 259). The state is constituted through, and riven with, class contradictions. It must not, therefore, be seen as monolithic (this being the shortcoming of Badiou’s approach to the state, as explored in Chap. 5 )—class contradictions are present within the state’s material framework and patterns of organisation (Poulantzas 1980 , p. 134). The rigidity of the state ensures that its manipulation at the hands of the bourgeois is a slow process (ibid, p. 138). Rather than assuming a position that works only against the state, as Badiou and Rancière advocate, it needs to be realised that the state, while rigid, can be subject to change from within. To illustrate the unfixed nature of the state Poulantzas (ibid, pp. 146–47) offers a “relational theory of power” as a means of explaining (primarily class) struggle. Power, he argues, is not a quantity or object; nor is it an essence, or substance, possessed by a dominant class. Insofar as power can be held by social classes, it … should be understood as the capacity of one or several classes to realise their specific interests. It is a concept designating the field of their struggle— that of the relationship of forces and of the relations between one class and another. … Th e capacity of one class to realise its interests is in opposition to the capacity (and interests) of other classes: the field of power is therefore strictly relational. (ibid, p. 147, emphasis in original) The power of a class is positional 1 —it stems from its objective place in political, economic and ideological relations. Each class’ position, and the degree of power stemming from holding this position, is delimited by other classes and/or class fractions. “Power … depends on, and springs from, a relational system of material places occupied by particular agents” (ibid, p. 147). State power, then, has no intrinsic essence but is rather the relations of social classes and forces. The state itself is the “strategic site of organisation of the dominant class in its relationship with dominated classes” (ibid, p. 148). In assessing the state today it can be seen that the interests of the capitalist class are paramount, free as they are from any concerted countervailing pressures—history shows this is not an inevitable arrangement. The relationship between the dominant and dominated classes is never straightforward. As the state is a field of strategic relations, power needs to be seen as mobile, as moving between apparatuses. Different state institutions house competing/rival class (or other) social relations (Levine 2002 , p. 176). Strategically the question must always be asked “who is in power to do what?” Th e state needs to be comprehended as a complex with higher (ruling) levels and subordinate levels. The aim of Marxist political analysis is to identify the sites within this complex where real power is concentrated—with “real power” denoting, here, the institutional resources (administration, executive power, budget) which allow the social class in power to maintain their superior position within political struggles (Codato and Perissinotto 2002 , p. 61): prime examples being the Federal Reserve or central banks which are, essentially, autonomous institutions, insulated from popular demands, or the appointment and tenure of Supreme Court judges. There are, however, always opportunities to tip the balance of powers one way or another—something Occupy, with its spurning of the state, failed to take into account. If there is no concerted opposition to capitalist rule, then practices seeking to maintain social cohesion will adhere exclusively to the interests of the capitalist class—a disorganised working class poses no threat to the stability of this class: “Although capital may indeed be able to adjust to the various working-class concessions and even to an expansion in social-welfare policies, there is no need to do so without a challenge coming from below” (Levine 2002 , p. 181). Although the key strategic points within the state are occupied by those who seek to perpetuate capitalism, it would be a mistake, argues Poulantzas ( 1980 , p. 153, emphasis in original), to cease conducting struggles within the strategic field of the state: We … know that, alongside their possible presence in the physical space of the state apparatuses, the popular masses must constantly maintain and deploy centres and networks at a distance from these apparatuses: I am referring, of course, to movements for direct, rank-and-fi le democracy and to self-management networks. But although these take up political objectives, they are not located outside the State or, in any case, outside power— contrary to the simplistic illusions of anti-institutional purity. What is more, to place oneself at any cost outside the State in the thought that one is thereby situated outside power (which is impossible) can often be the best means of leaving the field open for statism : in short, it often involves a retreat in the face of the enemy precisely on this strategically crucial terrain. The crucial point here is that there is no “outside” of the state to which movements can escape—positions can be assumed against the state by movements, but these need to be matched by actions within the field of the state by actors from the left. In conceptualising how this might be possible Poulantzas (ibid, p. 256, emphasis in original) sought to pose the question of democratic socialism anew: How is it possible to radically transform the state in such a manner that the extension and deepening of political freedoms and the institutions of representative democracy (which were all a conquest of the popular masses) are combined with the unfurling of forms of direct democracy and the mushrooming of selfmanagement bodies? In seeking an answer to this question it is important, he cautions, not to follow the “old illusion of anarchism” that the strategic field of the state can be abandoned. Political strategy must be grounded in the “autonomy of the organisations of the popular masses,” but their autonomy is not founded in some “outside” space. Th e popular masses, he argues, can deploy networks and centres of struggle at a distance from state apparatuses, but never from outside the state (ibid, p. 153). Th ere can be no simple opposition between “internal” and “external” struggle; rather, both must be simultaneously pursued (ibid, p. 260). Successful strategy entails maintaining a distance from the state (without imagining an outside), combined with taking action within the state to transform the state (Th omas 2002 , p. 76).

#### No permutations---they have to defend the end point of the political stance the aff took on the nature of oppression---if we have a link to their method of analysis you vote neg

Young, Professor emeritus of Political Science at the University of Chicago, 6

(Iris Marion, Responsibility and Global Justice, sites.coloradocollege.edu/engaging-the-global/files/2013/01/Young\_2006.pdf)

So far, I have offered only a way of thinking about responsibility in general. One might well object that the social connection model of responsibility raises as many questions as it answers. For example, the model says that all who participate by their actions in processes that produce injustice share responsibility for its remedy. Does this mean that all par- ticipants bear responsibility in the same way and to the same degree? If not, then what are the grounds for differentiating kinds and degrees of responsibility? Most of us participate in many structural processes, more- over, that arguably have disadvantaging, harmful, or unjust consequences for others. It is asking too much to expect most of us to work actively to restructure each and every one of the structural injustices for which we arguably share responsibility. How, then, should we reason about the best ways to use our limited time, resources, and creative energy to respond to structural injustice? Adequately responding to questions like these would take at least another full essay. Thus, I will only sketch answers here, and illustrate the responses once again through the example of the anti-sweatshop movement. Some moral theorists argue that responsibility names a form of obli- gationdistinctfromduty.JoelFeinberg,forexample,distinguishesbetween an ethic that focuses on obligation or duty and an ethic that focuses on responsibility. On the one hand, a duty specifies a rule of action or delin- eates the substance of what actions count as performing the duty. A responsibility, on the other hand, while no less obligatory, is more open with regard to what counts as carrying it out.49 A person with responsibilities is obliged to attend to outcomes that the responsibilities call for, and to orient her actions in ways demonstrably intended to contribute to bringing about those outcomes. Because a person may face many moral demands on her actions, and because changes in circumstances are often unpredictable, just how a person goes about discharging her responsibilities is a matter subject to considerable discretion.5° Given that a combination of responsibilities may be overly demanding, and given that agents have discretion in how they choose to discharge their responsibilities, it is reasonable to say that it is up to each agent to decide what she can and should do under the circumstances, and how she should order her moral priorities. Others have the right to question and criticize our decisions and actions, however, especially when we depend on one another to perform effective collective action. Part of what it means to be responsible on the social connection model is to be accountable to others with whom one shares responsibility—accountable for what one has decided to do and for which structural injustices one has chosen to address. When an agent is able to give an account of what she has done, and why, in terms of shared responsibilities for structural injustice, then others usually ought to accept her decision and the way she sets priorities for her actions. These considerations begin to provide an answer to the question I stated above, namel how should one reason about the best way to use one’s limited time and resources to respond to structural injustices? In a world with many and deep structural injustices, most of us, in principle, share more responsibility than we can reasonably be expected to discharge.5’ Thus, we must make choices about where our action can be most useful or which injustices we regard as most urgent. While a social connection model of responsibility will not give us a list of maxims or imperatives, it should offer some parameters for reasoning to guide our decisions and actions. These parameters, in turn, address the other ques tion I raised earlier—the question about kinds and degrees of responsibility. Different agents plausibly have different kinds of responsibilities in relation to particular issues of justice, and some arguably have a greater degree of responsibility than others.

#### The alternative entails constructing a collective ideology against capitalism---anything else supports white supremacy by giving coherence to the hegemony of individualism

Susana Narotsky 16, Barcelona professor, “On waging the ideological war: Against the hegemony of form”, Anthropological Theory 2016, Vol. 16, 263–284)

The problem of structure is, then, political: how to yield power, and to what end. The possibility of defining a project which is a pre-conception that designs a different structure (of connecting relationships) is alien to the new ‘philosophy of the event’ that I have described above. Therefore, the meaning of politics can only emerge from the contingent connections that create possible worlds and simultaneously enact them. In this approach, political innovation and creativity emerge in a similar way to the Austrian school’s conception in which the market – an arena of multiple singular events – helps unveil the knowledge that each individual creates in the spark of the exchange moment. This view, I suggest, expresses an epistemological and political ideology which mirrors the phenomenal form of capitalist relations. For the Austrian school, interference from a structured (i.e. planned) economic project (e.g. a social state project, cf. the socialist side of the socialist calculation debate) is anathema to the permanent discovery that the market enables. Likewise, interference from a political project (e.g. a conceived design of differently structured relationships) is anathema to the new politics of emergence. See, for example, the following quote: The extraordinary energy of attraction and aggregation revealed by the WSF9 [World Social Forum] resides precisely in refusing the idea of a general theory. The diversity that finds a haven in it is free from the fear of being cannibalized by false universalisms or false single strategies propounded by any general theory. The time we live in, whose recent past was dominated by the idea of a general theory, is perhaps a time of transition that may be defined in the following way: we have no need of a general theory, but still need a general theory on the impossibility of a general theory. (Santos, 2004a: 341, emphasis added) Conclusion: Waging the ideological war Maybe I am pushing the analogy too far here. However, I suggest that this similarity in form is an expression of the consolidation of the neoliberal hegemony. Indeed it points to the difficulty of daring to conceive of and propose a coherent project of a different world that would provide tools to end the destruction, dispossession and devaluation of life that affects the great majority of people all over the world (as opposed to creating a mirage of myriad possible worlds waging partial and concrete struggles). Capitalism is a modern totalitarian reality that presents itself as the highest expression of individual freedom. The liberal ideology of creative interaction resulting from the unplanned decisions of individual unconnected wills supports in fact a coherent and totalitarian project based on relations of depredation, dispossession and exploitation, sustained by regulated privilege and geared to capital and power accumulation in the hands of a few (humans). Therefore a counter-hegemonic force can only be created from a different formal framework, one that does not rest on the Austrian market model of creative discovery. I think we still need a unitary structure that can break down the hegemony of form that limits our present-day struggles. We need an integrated theory that connects concrete, singular, struggles to a whole and might provide a structured understanding of the world we live in. While many radical political economy scholars are repeatedly doing this in their analysis, the post-structural model dominates present-day oppositional politics. As I have addressed elsewhere (Narotzky, 2014), this results from histories of past betrayals and totalitarian enactments of grand theories which make resentment and caution legitimate. We need, however, to overcome a handicap that we don’t own. Different knowledges (or singularities) coming from different histories and cultural understandings need to be valued equally (equality) in their own terms (difference) but especially in terms of their potentiality to produce a structured, coherent, and powerful alternative that makes sense in a connected world. We are struggling against an enemy that has as its strongest weapon a hegemony that pervades our lives to the core in the West and increasingly all over the world. Admittedly, it is possible that the creative imagination of an alternative society will come from spaces not yet totally subsumed to capitalism that exist everywhere (Williams, 1977). But in order to accomplish durable change this vision needs to become an ideology of sorts where the many feel represented and willing to act. This ideology should be able to explain the experiences that most people have in their various forms of existence all over the world, and be able to propose an alternative that makes sense to the many all over the world. Indeed, in order to rehabilitate ideology as an oppositional instrument we need to pay attention to what people are doing and saying, and here the ‘sociology of absences’ (Santos, 2004a) and the emphasis on ‘knowledges otherwise’ (Escobar, 2007) is crucial to overcome the ~~blindness~~ {problems} that a hegemonic project has created. But we also need the courage to make connections and create logical paths, proposing a general theory of how social relations are governed and how they should be challenged and transformed. I am referring here to what Eric Wolf defined as ‘structural power’: ‘Structural power shapes the social field of action so as to render some kinds of behavior possible, while making others less possible or impossible’ (1990: 587). At a level of signification we need to produce conceptual order which will create a differentmapping of what ‘sociologies’ should be made ‘absent’ (new ‘sociologies of absence’). We should be willing to draw a different selection of what connections count and what forms of knowledge we require in order to challenge the present structures of power. This, I suggest, is the ideology that we are at present unable to produce. At present, the only integrated alternative ‘oppositional’ ideologies are being mostly provided by religions and nationalisms. Ramon and Juan say they repudiate ‘ideology’ as an instrument of struggle for ‘tactical’ reasons. Left ideologies as entrenched in the discourses of governing parties (social-democratic parties) and classic trade unions are useless because they do not express the present-day injuries of capitalism. On the one hand, the ideology of the Left has been recurrently subverted and discredited by the actions of those who achieved power under that banner. On the other hand, the injured masses have changed and their real lives have subverted the classical Left labour/capital centred model of structural relations. While the classic wage relationship (lack of ownership of means of production and hence exploitation of labour) is still widely spread in most parts of the world, other forms of dispossession (e.g. financial rent extraction), dependency (petty commodity production, bonded labour) and abandonment (absolute surplus population) are growing. Therefore the old explanatory model does not make sense any longer in the present situation, and the attached transformative project has been repeatedly discredited by the parties’ practice. A return to the real world is necessary. What Ramon and Juan see as a ‘tactical’ move away from old models in order to better represent the experiences of the majority needs, however, to be reframed in a coherent framework that is able to challenge the logics of capitalism. The ethnographic position of listening to the variously injured voices and their practical proposals does not exempt us from the responsibility to propose a different overall model of a better society and to believe that, at a particular historical conjuncture, the dominant model needs to be challenged by a unified force. This can only be achieved by the construction of a theory that relates the parts to a whole in a way that makes sense to the many and is capable of confronting the model of reality that is deeply entrenched in a hegemonic (Austrian market) form. To propose the need of such an integrated theory and its political expression as an oppositional ideology does not imply considering all struggles homogeneous; this would be unreasonable as we know that capitalism expresses itself unevenly. Neither does it imply that the theory or its constitutive elements (concepts, logical connections, analyses) will not be challenged; as the world changes they will and should be permanently put into question. But this is a war, and we need a powerful weapon which can match the neoliberal hegemony of form. In the non-secular realms many models exist that directly (often violently) struggle for hegemony in different parts of the world. It is the secular realm (historically a product of the Enlightenment, and hence of the same liberal movement that supported the expansion of capitalism and socialism) that seems to be unable to produce an emancipatory model that subverts the neoliberal hegemony entrenched after the failure of the socialist experiments. Some models are incipient. One is the illiberal model of a hierarchical status society (an organic solidarity of the corporatist kind), which harmonizes difference by taming privilege through patronage and creating strong exclusionary borders and discarded people at the margins. This struggle to push oneself into the space of recognition by cultivating patronage networks (Ferguson, 2013) or by recurrently banning access to other claimants (Kalb, 2011; Holmes, 2000) is very different from the one seeking to destroy enclosures on the basis that ‘another world is possible’. In the latter category, the World Social Forum (WSF) model, which extends the liberal form to the struggles against capitalism, refuses to produce a unified social project and supports a fragmented, partial and often inconsistent confrontation with the totalitarian forces of capital, a problem that is recognized by one of its more lucid advocates: ‘The other characteristic of transnational sub-politics, a negative one, is that, so far, theories of separation have prevailed over theories of union among the great variety of existing movements, campaigns and initiatives’ (Santos, 2001: 191). A model such as that of the WSF is commendable because it refuses to institute a dominant form of knowledge and the unique authority of a universal social model (Santos, 2004a: 341) in the face of a hegemonic model that normalizes oppression and exploitation. However, its strength is also its weakness. Instead, I propose that in order to transform the dominant political economic structure in such a way that capitalist forms of accumulation are destroyed and substituted by a human economy (Hart et al., 2010), it is necessary to have the courage of an oppositional ideology that can become a counter-hegemony benefiting the many.

#### Marxist coalitional politics can be strategic and flexible to disrupt violence especially for Black women---they’re empirically effective at addressing the intersections of homophobia and racism through flexible coalitions focused on the uniting factor of class.

Patricia Hill Collins 17, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, 4-5-2017, "On violence, intersectionality and transversal politics," Ethnic And Racial Studies Volume 40, 2017 - Issue 9, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01419870.2017.1317827

Towards transversal politics: flexible solidarity and coalition building When I wrote “The Tie That Binds”, I hoped that developing intersectionality’s theoretical contours might contribute to ameliorating violence as a social problem. Yet intersectional analyses, on their own, are unlikely to yield more effective political solutions to violence. Analysis is important, yet action also matters. Because “thinking” one’s way out of domination is unrealistic, I now ask, how might more sophisticated analyses of power that take into account the ties linking violence, intersecting oppressions and domination facilitate more robust analyses of political resistance? In “The Tie That Binds”, I discussed transversal politics as a form of political engagement that had important implications for understanding organized political resistance. Here I return to that argument via a brief discussion of solidarity and coalition-building. The responses of African American women and similarly historically subordinated groups to intersecting oppressions illuminates the nature of political domination as well the transversal politics it might engender. For example, African American women’s intellectual and political traditions raise some provocative questions concerning the nature of political solidarity. The trajectory of Black feminism within African American communities suggests that Black women’s responses to racial violence moved beyond racial solidarity that was centred exclusively on racism. Black feminist agendas regarding gender and sexuality existed much earlier than when they became visible to a broader public. The story of how Black feminism’s analyses of gender and sexuality advanced intersectional arguments is well-known. Yet the ways in which Black feminist understandings of political solidarity may have been shaped by intersectional analyses remains less familiar. In my recent work, I have returned to issues of political solidarity and coalition politics within African American women’s history (see e.g. Collins forthcoming 2017). Black women’s experiences with violence provide guidance, not as a universal case for oppressed groups, but rather as a catalyst for theoretical insight concerning the interconnections of domination and resistance. Because contemporary forms of violence visited upon African American women have become so routinized in U.S. social institutions and normalized within public hate speech, it is easy to overlook the centrality of violence to the origins and history of African Americans as a U.S. population group. African Americans became Black people in the context of a forced migration within global capitalist expansion, the differential exploitation of productive and reproductive labour of men and women during slavery, and the subsequent structural disadvantages have shaped African American life. Ghettoization and racial segregation were key to African American domination in the U.S. context. Persistent high levels of residential, educational and employment segregation in the U.S. constitute fundamental structural features that contribute to racial hierarchy. Violence was essential to forming Black people as a population as well as the shared meanings that were associated with this political Blackness. For African American women, these social conditions catalysed a particular form of politics, one characterized on the one hand by a stance of dissemblance from the external world whereby Black women hid the harm they experienced from rape, abuse and forms sexual violence (Hine 1989); and on the other hand, a distinctive Black feminist politics that reflected Black women’s analyses and actions in response to the ever-present threat of violence. As a collectively, Black women in the U.S. could not ignore how anti-Black hate speech and routinized racial violence took gender-specific forms. In this social context, Black women developed a more strategic, dynamic and sophisticated approach to solidarity that refutes understandings of solidarity as ideological uniformity that, within African American communities, took patriarchal and homophobic forms. Yet many Black feminist intellectual-activists never fully accepted this kind of group-think that define solidarity through the ideological lens of a homogeneous blackness that privileged masculinity and heterosexuality. Instead, Black women were more likely to see the ways in which they were simultaneously in solidarity with Black men regarding racism as well as the ways in which such solidarity was problematic regarding sexism and homophobia. Historically, Black women intellectual-activists developed forms of political action that were characterized by a flexible solidarity, one where alliances within African American communities have been grounded in ongoing relationships of compromise and contestation (Collins forthcoming 2017). Black women’s community work in particular fostered a commitment to Black solidarity as a core feature of African American women’s political engagement both within and on behalf of Black communities (Collins 2006, 123–160). Without solidarity among African Americans, political struggles to upend racial domination were doomed. Yet for Black women, an unquestioned solidarity could be neither inherently desirable nor effective when it rested on male-dominated, intergenerational gender hierarchies. Such solidarity was hierarchical, rigid, often backed up by religious theology or tradition, and created roadblocks for effective political action. Black women saw the need for solidarity, yet calibrated their ideas and actions to hone critical understandings of solidarity that were better suited for specific political projects, for example, opposing both lynching and rape because they were interconnected practices of violence. Solidarity was not an essentialist category, a bundle of rules that was blindly applied across time and space. Instead, a flexible understanding of solidarity enabled African American women to work with the concept, moulding it to the particular challenges at hand. Working within African American organizations often sensitized Black women to inequalities of gender and sexuality within African American communities as well as within broader society. This awareness catalysed a deepening analysis of intersectionality during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, these intellectual and political understandings of solidarity were also worked out over time, primarily through everyday, organized political behaviour within African American communities. Stated differently, sustaining political vigilance in the face of racism required being attuned to the political implications both of ideology and strategy. This idea of flexible solidarity within Black feminism lays a foundation for the kind of elasticity that Nira Yuval-Davis assigns to transversal politics (Yuval-Davis 1997, 125–132). Drawing on the work of Italian feminists, Yuval-Davis concludes her book Gender and Nation with a section sketching out several political and intellectual projects that seem to point toward a transversal politics. Rereading Yuval-Davis’s arguments, especially in light of the shifting interpretive climate of hate speech, the more visible connections between hate speech and actions, and the scope of routinized violence, suggests that revisiting the main ideas of transversal politics may be especially constructive. Several points stand out that merit review. For one, Yuval-Davis eschews understandings of groups that are based solely on self-chosen identities or identifications. Instead, she focuses on the authority of nation-states in creating and reproducing historically constituted, socially stratified population groups. She notes, “the boundaries of the groupings were determined not by an essentialist notion of difference, but by a concrete and material political reality” (Yuval-Davis 1997, 129). In the 1980s and into the 1990s, an emerging feminist literature on intersectionality engaged nationalism, examining topics such as how the public policies of nation-states were inherently intersectional, how the national identities of various nation-states relied on intersecting systems of power, and how differential citizenship rights underlay social inequalities (see e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). Scholars in the 1990s seemingly moved away from the literature on nation-states and nationalism, especially its emphasis on the structures of state power. Rereading Yuval Davis in the aftermath of this discursive turn shows how she places far more emphasis on historically constituted groups and the opportunities and constraints they bring to coalition politics than contemporary emphases on individuals and their rights. Bringing groups back into analysis creates space to analyse inter-group politics. Yuval-Davis describes the structured yet dynamic sense of coalitions as being “rooted” in a particular social context but also “shifting” in order to engage in transversal dialogues and politics. Yuval-Davis’s depiction of transversal politics requires processes of shifting that do not mean losing one’s own rooting within historically situated communities and the intellectual and political sensibilities that rooting engenders. In this sense, ideas about intersectionality and flexibility that Black women develop within African American communities need not be jettisoned when shifting toward transversal politics. Far from one of subordinating one’s issues into some greater good, as suggested within prevailing understandings of solidarity, remaining rooted while shifting constitutes a viable if not essential political option. Another dimension of shifting is equally significant: the process of shifting must maintain the multiplicity of perspectives both within a group and across groups. This is the difficult challenge, one that recognizes that some coalitions may not be possible. My reading of the historical trajectory of Black feminism in the U.S. is that the flexible solidarity that Black women exhibit across many historical periods, and that informs intersectionality, constitute a missing dimension of transversal politics. Instead, the flexible solidarity by Black women within African American communities, when coupled with Yuval Davis’s framework of the rooting and shifting of transversal politics, potentially facilitates thinking through coalition politics within a context of intersecting power relations. How might the concept of flexible solidarity honed through Black women’s politics within African American communities and the idea of transversal politics as a framework for coalitions among groups inform anti-violence initiatives? Flexible solidarity and transversal politics remain abstract, and some might argue, unrealistic aspirational constructs. One construct seems wedded to past practices (flexible solidarity) whereas the other points toward an as yet unrealized future (transversal politics). Perhaps, however, both constructs inform contemporary anti-violence initiatives. Take, for example, the effective political mobilization of the Black Lives Matter movement against state-sanctioned violence (Cobb 2016). This movement illustrates how the ideas of intersectionality and flexible solidarity honed within Black feminism suggest a move toward transversal politics as a way to resist violence. Initially led by three queer African American women who created the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, the stellar growth of Black Lives Matter from 2012 to 2016 illustrates how the legacy of Black feminism has been brought to bear on the contemporary social problem of state-sanctioned racial violence. The deaths of several young African American men, widely shared on social media, was the spark that catalysed the movement. Yet Black women have been visible within the Black Lives Matter movement, from the initial leadership of the movement, to the large numbers Black women participating in the protests, demonstrations and urban rebellions that sustained the vitality of the movement. In essence, Black women who catalysed this movement drew upon the legacy of a Black feminism’s long history of resisting violence targeted toward Black people. At its inception, the Black Lives Matter movement also invoked the idea of intersectionality to expand the categories of Black people who should be respected by the movement. Historically, Black women themselves had used the idea of flexible solidarity to choose strategic moments to broaden Black solidarity to address issues of gender. The initial hashtag #BlackLivesMatter expressed a similar deepening of an intersectional analysis of Blackness, now expanded to highlight the issues of groups that were historically subordinated within Black communities. The web site of the Black Lives Matter movement has undergone substantial updating as the organization has grown, yet the initial intersectional description of their mission has remained constant: Rooted in the experiences of Black people in this country who actively resist our dehumanization, #BlackLivesMatter is a call to action and a response to the virulent anti-Black racism that permeates our society. Black Lives Matter is a unique contribution that goes beyond extrajudicial killings of Black people by police and vigilantes … Black Lives Matter affirms the lives of Black queer and trans folks, disabled folks, black-undocumented folks, folks with records, women and all Black lives along the gender spectrum. It centers those that have been marginalized within Black liberation movement. (blacklivesmatter.com) The movement as laid out by the founders of #BlackLivesMatter is clearly intersectional by highlighting how all Black individuals within Black communities were worthy of political protection. Their intersectional mandate deepens analysis of how different sub-groups within Black communities experience racial domination. It is rooted in a collective Black past, yet not one that is uncritically celebrated or that mandates knee-jerk adherence to solidarity. Significantly, as the movement has grown, its organizational practices also illustrate the goal of drawing upon flexible solidarity to strengthen both its own organizational capacities as a political community as well as those of other Black political communities. As the movement has evolved, it rejected the hierarchical bureaucracies of traditional civil rights organizations in favour of a more fluid decentralized organizational structure that allows it to draw upon the flexibility of networks. This focus on flexible coalitions within a Black movement sets the stage for potential coalitions with external groups. In this sense, Black Lives Matter remains rooted in its anti-violence project, yet embraces a form of flexible solidarity within its practices that sees coalitions as always under construction and not as ideologically fixed. This orientation positions it to remain rooted in the needs of its own praxis. Black Lives Matter points to the necessary interconnectedness of intersectionality and flexible solidarity within its own praxis as well as the continued challenges of using these ideas within broader social movements. This example also signals the challenges of future coalition building with other groups that have been inspired by this movement, yet must find ways to bring more sophisticated understandings of their own group histories to the transversal politics that might ensue. Developing more complex analyses of intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry and praxis that resists violence promises to be a long-term intellectual and political project. Because violence is so deeply embedded into the fabric of society, it is unlikely to yield to the efforts of any one theory or group of social actors. Yet just as intersecting oppressions are far from static, forms of political resistance that are similarly flexible are well-positioned for such sustained intellectual and political struggle. In this endeavour, continuing to focus on violence should illuminate new connections between intersecting systems of power and on new possibilities for political resistance.